Sample social science paper: The tragedy of Japanese internment camps - analyzing Korematsu v. United States

In the wake of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States set up internment camps in which thousands of Japanese Americans were sent because of the fear that they might be foreign agents. One person who was sent to the camp took his case to the Supreme Court and lost. This sample political science paper argues why the court, in Korematsu v. United States, was wrong. Specifically, the author argues that the court applied a rational basis test instead of a strict scrutiny test. This sample government and politics paper would be a good reference for someone who wants to write about a major court case that in retrospect is viewed negatively.

Rational basis vs. Strict Scrutiny: Which test did the Court apply in Korematu?

This essay will evaluate what standard of review was actually applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States. It is important to understand what standard of review was used because they are the lens through which a court judges constitutionality of a legislative classification. Depending upon which standard of review is applied, a court will either assume the legislative classification in question is constitutional or unconstitutional. If a court applies strict scrutiny standard of review, it carries a very strong presumption of unconstitutionality. However, if a court applies rational basis standard of review, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality. Furthermore, the type of review used, depicts what types of justification the side with the burden of proof is required to show. Thus, the standard of review used in a case has a serious impact on how the case will be decided. I believe the Supreme Court, in contrast to what Justice Black stated in his majority opinion, applied rational basis standard of review in Korematsu.

The majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States is in opposition to my view that rational basis, not strict scrutiny was applied. In the case, the Court held that Executive Order 9066 was constitutional and passed strict scrutiny standard of review. They claimed the need to protect the country against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. In Justice Black's majority opinion he stated that Executive Order 9066 is a racial classification and therefore triggers strict scrutiny. Meaning, that in order to pass strict scrutiny standard of review, the state must have a compelling interest in making the legislative classification and show the legislative means are narrowly tailored to serve the legislative ends.

In reviewing the case, the Court examined whether the state had a compelling interest to exclude and intern anyone of Japanese ancestry. The majority argued that pressing public necessity could justify racial restrictions when pure racial antagonism cannot (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, 1202). They claimed national security was a compelling interest and that the military and congress acted constitutionally in creating the internment order. Ultimately, the majority concluded that national security concerns was a compelling enough interest to overcome the very strong presumption of unconstitutionality incorporated in strict scrutiny, the standard of review the majority claims to apply. Although the majority opinion spends a good deal of time explaining the state had a compelling interest, they barely address the part of strict scrutiny requiring the legislative means be narrowly tailored to the legislative ends. The only statement that vaguely addresses it is when Black writes that interning Japanese has a clear and close relationship to stopping espionage (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, 1202).

In my opinion, the Court could not have upheld the legislative classification interning people of Japanese ancestry if strict scrutiny had truly been applied. Consequently, rational basis must have been the standard of review used. First off, the Court deferred to other branches of government in making their decision, which seems to imply rational basis rather than strict scrutiny. In the majority opinion, Black specifically writes that the war making branches of government had "ground" to create the internment order. However, "having ground" for a legislative classification is much closer to the language of rational basis, which requires the person challenging the legislation to show state lacks a legitimate interest and the legislative means are not rationally related to the legislative ends.

Secondly, I don't believe the state actually had a compelling interest in making the legislation and therefore the Court must have applied rational basis in order to uphold Executive Order 9066. As Justice Murphy writes in his dissent, not one person of Japanese ancestry was tried or convicted for espionage while they were free in the time between the Pearl Harbor attack and the internment (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, 1203). Illustrating my point that the state certainly did not have a compelling interest to make legislation interning Japanese Americans. Although the state did not have a compelling interest, they definitely had a legitimate interest, which would have enabled the legislative classification to pass rational basis standard of review and be ruled constitutional.

In addition to the lack of a compelling interest, the legislative classification was not narrowly tailored, and therefore could not have passed strict scrutiny standard of review. The state clearly could have used less drastic means to protect against espionage. They could have set up loyalty hearings with people of Japanese ancestry, closed communication between the U.S. and Japan, or closed the border to anyone coming or going to Asia. However, the state's legislative classification was rationally related to the end goal of promoting national security because it did advance security against espionage. Under rational basis, as long as the legislative means don't directly oppose the legislative ends there is a rational relationship. In addition, the legislative classification had a significant amount of over and under inclusion within it. Executive Order 9066 was over inclusive because it included 112,000 people, of whom 70,000 were American citizens (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, 1203). The order also included the elderly and children. Hundreds of thousands of people were included who were certainly not spies. Secondly, the legislative classification was under inclusive because it only included people of Japanese ancestry. There could have been spies of another ancestry who would not have been included. Moreover, if the Court had actually applied strict scrutiny as it claimed, it is impossible with such a significant amount of over and under inclusion that the Court could have concluded the Executive Order was narrowly tailored enough to satisfy strict scrutiny. This fuels my view that rational basis was the standard truly used.

One of the first objections those who believe the majority did use strict scrutiny would argue, is that since Executive Order 9066 was a racial classification it would have immediately triggered strict scrutiny. They would claim that all racial classifications fall under strict scrutiny and that Korematsu was no different. Another argument they could make is that as Justice Black said, "pressing public necessity" (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, 1202) in this case justifies race specific restrictions, therefore demonstrating that the state did have a compelling interest in making Executive Order 9066. Furthermore, opponents of my view may claim that just because no one of Japanese ancestry was tried or convicted of espionage between Pearl Harbor and the internment doesn't mean spies didn't exist.

Additionally, those who disagree with me would argue that although the legislative classification was over and under inclusive, it was an effective means for ensuring Japanese Americans couldn't act as spies. Thus, claiming that internment was effective and that in times of war, national security can sometimes trump the need for narrowly tailored legislative classifications. Lastly, they may argue that other ways to have prevented espionage such as loyalty hearings and closing the border would have been too costly and inconvenient. Consequently, claiming that interning people of Japanese ancestry was necessary enough.

In order to refute the notion that strict scrutiny must have been applied since it was a racial classification, I would first agree that strict scrutiny should have been used, yet if it had, the Court could never have upheld Executive Order 9066. Next, there was no record during the time surrounding the internment that the FBI did not have the espionage situation already under control and therefore, the state did not have a compelling interest in making Executive order 9066. Secondly, although national security is important, it does not justify such obvious actions against someone solely because of their race. Furthermore, the state did have a legitimate interest in making the legislative classification, proving that the Court ruled Executive Order 9066 constitutional because they applied rational basis. Even if there was a compelling interest to enact the internment, the interment order never could have passed the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny. There was simply too much over and under inclusion within the interment order, to satisfy any standard of review other than rational basis. Finally, my opponents claim that interning Japanese Americans was "necessary enough" meaning rationally related, only strengthens my view that rational basis, not strict scrutiny was applied in Korematsu.

In conclusion, the Court's majority opinion to uphold Executive Order 9066 and rule the interment constitutional reveals that rational basis was the standard of review truly administered. The legislative classification clearly had far too severe over and under inclusion to have passed strict scrutiny standard of review. Despite Justice Black's claim that the court used strict scrutiny, it was the presumption of constitutionality incorporated in rational basis that enabled the Court to uphold the internment of Japanese Americans.
 

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